Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 36

Issue 3

Article 2

1948

Do You Agree With This Case?
H. E. Nelson
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Legal Education Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Nelson, H. E. (1948) "Do You Agree With This Case?," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 36: Iss. 3, Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol36/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS CASE I
By H. E. NELsoN*

"Do you agree with this easel" "Do you like this casel"
"Do you approve of this casel" "Do you think tins case is
soundly decided?" No matter how the question is worded, I
frequently find it embarrassing when asked of me. This may
come as an odd confession from one who in theory, at least,
should be expected to include the evaluation of the fruit of our
judicial systems as part of his daily work, but my dilemma can
possibly serve to guide an inquiry as to what should be done
when law is studied under the very best and most inspired
method of instruction.
There are various motivations behind the student questioners' resort to this question in class. A dull student may wish
to bring is presence to the attention of the teacher, presumably
without much risk of any commitment on the part of the student.
The question can have about it a false cloak of rapt attention and
deference to the unplumbed sagacity of the teacher, suggesting
an insatiable absorption on the part of the student. When
fairly certain the question has thus been blandly put, I am
often tempted to hoist the interrogator by his own petard and
ask him what he thinks about it. This often causes the student
to assume a hurt and double-crossed look, crowns him a martyr,
and creates the firm conviction in the minds of many other
students that "Nelson doesn't know, so he's passing the buck
to poor Fogwit."
The fact that this has sometimes -been a
correct appraisal of the verbal exchange is one of the reasons for
preparing this paper and attempting to get to the very heart of
the question.
I am also not too happy in my attempts to answer the
question when I feel that even when my evaluations do attain
a fair degree of adequacy, some of the students will condense
all very perfunctorily in their notebooks-that is, those will
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky Law School, Lexington, Kentucky. A.B. and LL.B., Umv. of Illinois, LL.M., Univ. of
Micugan.
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who lend some comfort and aid to such allies and cherish them
as treasures. The abridged versions will encompass such pithy
comments as "Nelson approves," or "Nelson thinks case bad-too something."
This cheerless view of the situation tempts me to suggest
that there may be a method that is better than the one so often
followed in the way cases are evaluated-a method that might
even inspire intelligent notes in the notebooks of dull students.
Why shouldn't there be an approach which transcends a particular case and goes to the very heart and fundamentals of Law?
It is for the purpose of exploring such possibilities that this
paper finds another reason for coming into existence. What, if
I had the time and the qualifications, could I tell my student
who asks me the question which is the theme of this article?
I am not proud to admit that I have sometimes replied to
the question, "I like the case," or "I don't think much of the
case."
And I have given little reasoning for my reactions,
while to the joint shame of my students and myself, there has
been little objection voiced. To say that you like or dislike a
case, a necktie, or custard pie is twice as easy as missing a bus
and even less susceptible of successful contradiction. What
room for argument is there when a man has just said "I like
Plunkett Iron Works Ltd. v. Doodles, or "I like Noel Coward,"
or "I don't like Frank Sinatra?"
Indeed, the only hope of ever arousing an argument with
a man who has made one of these categorical asseverations is
either to resort successfully to clairvoyance so as to demonstrate that his spoken words are not supported by his thoughts,
or to attempt to refute what he has said by making reference
to earlier words or to acts on his part which are incompatible
with his most recent statement. Clairvoyance is not generally
accepted today as a reliable method, while an attempt to disprove
the words by the second method is open to the rejoinder that
the speaker has changed his mind since the time of the earlier
words or acts.
The arguments arise when one man tells another that he
"ought to" like or dislike a certain case, vegetable, or doctrine.
Then the controversy can wax warm. But to a mere "I like"
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statement, the only logical reply by way of direct contradiction
is to say, "Oh no, you don't like what you just said you like." Be
this as it may, many a heated disagreement has originated in
the endeavor to unsettle another's likes or dislikes, charging
them with being ill-founded or silly When reasons are sought
and offered for likes and dislikes, some value may be found ih
a clash of preferences or rejections.
The nation now numbers its population at morp than
144,000,000 human beings, and I am satisfied that not only an
insignificant but a minute and unmilitant minority of these
people care in the slightest about what I like or dislike. Furthermore, an indifference to my reactions by those who believe in
rational processes may be well-deserved if I have come into the
possession of my likes and dislikes through prejudice and scatterbrained thinking. For example I may "like" the decision of
the Court in Pltunkett Iron Works Ltd. v. Doodles because I
have an antipathy towards one of the employees or stockholders
of the Plunkett Company, or because Andrew Z. Doodles is ,an
old school chum of mine. Or I may "like" 'the case, because it
holds a big corporation liable to pay heavy damages to a
poor man, regardless of fault, and I am always sympathetic
towards underdogs, suspicious of big dogs. I may "ik " all
tax cases which hold against the Collector, because I dislike
paying taxes and never devote any thought to the question of
whether taxes are necessary and as to how they should be levied,
if necessary I may "dislike" any case which holds in favor of
a farmer or of a labor union, because I don't enjoy paying high
prices for food and manufactured goods, and I have a closed
mind upon the conviction that farmers and laborers are to
blame for the high prices.
Probably more time than is warranted has been given to
establishing the proposition that the weakest and most unjustifiable response to our theme question is a dogmatic "I like it" or
"I dislike it" although essentially these responses are made
more often than we realize.
Next to be considered is the reliance-upon-precedent style of
reply Under this head may be found such solemn and impressive judicious responses as "Most authorities have so held," or
L. J.-2
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"The great majority of courts here and in England have held
contra." This sort of response is what too many of our students
naively believe it is the prime function of the teacher to deliver,
and when their impatient ears catch, these honey-sentences the
students make double-haste to inscribe in their notebooks the
substance of the invaluable information. The students under
the present system are too much apt to think that the sole
function of a legal mind is to assemble precedents in overwhelming columns, to memorize the rules winch they are supposed to
support, and then to use them in winning lawsuits or in
writing law examinations. I sometimes refer to tins misguided
theory as the nickel-m-a-slot kind of classroom techique. The
student puts a nickel in the slot by asking the teacher "What is
the majority rule on tins point V'" or "What does our state hold
on this question?" Then the instructor, if he is informed but
fatuous enough to respond, plays ins little record of what the
majority rule is, or what the local jurisdiction holds. Far
better would it b6 if he were to tell ins students that the library
is fully equipped with digests, treatises, and texts winch will
answer their questions of this sort for them-and afford them
good practice in elementary research. The classroom work
should not be a bandying of precedents, but a descent below the
superficial level of precedents.
Indeed, it requires no brilliantly constructive tbinking
and but an average amount of mental ability and legal training
to dig out, analyze, classify, and statistical-ize the precedents.
The advantages and the disadvantages of the doctrine of Stare
Decists have been the subject of so much controversy and writing
that there is no need here to repeat the arguments. Suffice it
to say that the doctrine is not appreciably near excision. And
undoubtedly when the study of Law is thought of in its practical
case-winning and examination-writing roles, close familiarity
with the precedents on all pertinent questions is necessary,
however much it may fail fully to provoke penetrating or
original thinking.
But Law finds a most important and permanent significance in the policy-making function, which, it is submitted,
requires more than mere reliance upon precedents or obeisance
to liles and dislikes for proper development. Bef6ie taking up
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this policy-making function and what should lie behind it, let
me express my gratitude and pleasure that so long as there is
some necessary resorting to precedents, I am-delighted that many
of my fellows enjoy unearthing and collating precedents and in
giving to the world the products of their labors. And I look with
approval upon the training which is given many law students
who devote energy and time to the, preparation of law reviews
and who must undertake a rather intensive discipline, in the
assembling and evaluating of precedents. Such a training is
of true worth in providing the student with some of the practical training he should have in the field of research.
On the other hand, it may be questionable whether faculty
members are employing their time as profitably and maturely
as they could when they turn out manuscripts of concentrated
precedents wherein may be found a minimum of constructive or
original thought. Almost any plodding, conscientious, run-ofthe-mill lawyer can assemble precedents systematically and
helpfully Doubtless such labor is satisfying to those who find
their chief curiosity to consist of finding out what judges said
and did about a problem during the course of the centuries,
albeit a mind with tis predilection may seem in some respects
pathetically cobwebby and definitely limited. Nor do I mean
to suggest that there are not instances when nice distinctions and
deep analyses are required, as shown in the writings of our truly
great writers of legal literature.
Legal literature that is great must often be so on its own
feet, because of the felicitous and persuasive wording of the
author. Yet many of our pieces of legal literature reflect the
minds of those who glory in the abundance of footnotes, heedless of the fact that these may stand as eloquent evidence of
how little that is printed is the author's own, and of how
slavishly he has read, selected, and prepared the words of
others. In this kind of writing, words per se apparently are
not thought to have the power to convince, and their great
distinction comes from the prestige of their original user.
I should accord a subordinate although not dispensable
place to these writers who have served at best as -verbal conduits
for a number of genuine and original minds, and who have
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manifested a tireless capacity for drawing sentences together
which are almost inevitably reinforced by numerous columns of
footnotes. And when they offer imposng lines of precedento,
they are as the miners of Law who dig the ore and do some
screemng of it, while the true architects are grateful, for from
this ore they may mould and erect the great mansions of Law in
accord with their own keen and original concepts of legal architecture.
If I look with disfavor upon the "I like" or "I dislike"
answer to our question, and if I believe that the answer wnch
limits itself to precedents is inadequate, what other possibility
remains for consideration?
The remaining possibility should reqire reasons winch do
not depend upon either the finality of precedent or the subjective bias of simple like or dislike. But this third method
involves the application invariably of one's personal philosophy,
in its broadest sense, without uninterrupted resort to the objective realm. It requires that the one answering must first assemble all pertinent premises, carefully select those which he believes have sufficient validity to justify his reliance, and finally
apply these last premises to the case which is to be evaluated.
If this process is faithfully, carried through, it will be seen
how Law in its policy-making function can well be said to
comprise the whole of human experience and thought. It will
be understood how impossible it is to separate Law from the
fields of philosophy, art, science, and literature, and it will be
realized that Law, on its sublimer level of policy-making, cannot
possibly dispense with the background of a broad and enlightening liberal arts and sciences education.
What I am advocating is probably beyond the capacities of
most of our law schools of today, which treat largely not of the
policy-making function of Law, although this incidentally and
at times unescapably appears, but of the practical side of
precedent and legislative enactments. Too many of the teachers
are not so well equipped and educated themselves as to be able
to offer satisfactory answers and reasons which trace back
through a maze of interlocking premises, drawn from all fields of
human learning, experience, and thought. Some of them don't
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even have the vision or the interest of this kind. The law
teacher is likely to be a specialist, and that in a single field of
Law, and he rarely gets far back of even his specialization in
Law. Yet fundamentally one gets back to the same inevitable
premises when a question of seemingly narrow import about
Contracts is asked as when the obviously more broad and
philosophical question characteristic of Constitutional Law is
posed.
The author certainly feels his own disqualifications with
respect to assembling, evaluating, and applying of the pertinent
premises needed to implement an intelligently reasoned reply to
the question, "Do you agree with this case9" But he nevertheless ventures to suggest what he thinks would be best, could
it be done. The approach he advocates and outlines would make
Law the special and focused application of all human experience
and thought, the funnel through which is channeled for impact
upon the conduct of human beings the most acceptable of the
pertinent premises drawn from science, art, literature, and
philosophy
Inasmuch as the acceptability of these premises and the
validity acorded them varies in the judgment of individuals, the
reply to our topical question must depend upon the individual,
and, essentially, upon the individual's philosophy The judgment of evaluation of a case may well be no better or no worse,
no more valid or invalid, than is the philosophy of the individual.
Most people escape from feeling great concern over the
judgments they pass upon causes, politics, economics, and the
like, although the process of judging or evaluating is basically
the same whatever is to be judged. We, all of us, rely upon
premises, of course, but we often fail to take properly into
account the -controlling premises, and we vaguely rest upon
premises which have never been sufficiently validated. People
differ widely in their conduct with respect to the relative degree
they rely upon unproven premises and fail to weed out the least
tenable. Many of us escape from worry, because we lack the
interest or the capacity to do the gruelling mental work of
screemng our premises.
Emotions play a large part in our reactions, as we all
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know. Men and women are gregarious, they like to belong, to be
affiliated with others in a lodge, a club, a political campaign,
a war, and their joy is in the victory their side effects rather
than in the validity of the goal sought. The glory comes from
"my side wins," with often an additional personal conceit and
expansion being added on the notion that we have personally
contributed largely to the victory Occasionally we meet the
lonely and reserved intellectual, who elevates the rational over
the emotional and fails to be normal and to lose himself in a
will to win for "my side," and who thereby suffers the distrust
of his normal fellow creatures in their failure to understand a
quirk of personality which places so high a premium upon
validation of the goal and end that it cannot experience complete satisfhction in the emotional joy of being a part of the
victorious group, The man of action, it is true, may rarely do
much conscious worrying about premises, and if he happens to
choose wisely he is fortunate in the time and worry saved. But
we are not secure in relying upon our men of action in emergencies as being such fortunate choosers.
The happier way for us may be to brush aside any concern
over the validity of our premises, even to be oblivious to their
existence, or to decide arbitrarily that we will accept certain
premises, because it is too, much trouble to investigate them,
andwe can never really at our 'best absolutely validate them,
anyway If we pursue 'this route, we are free to enjoy the
emotional life, to be active in group endeavors, to confine our
legal thinking to the search for appropriate prebedents.
But to return to our subject what would be required were
one to give the most thoroughgoing and unemotional response
to our troublesome question What premises are needed? H ow
does it come about that the simplest case in Law, when comprehensively and, broadly evaluated, can precipitate a probe into
the very depths of human experience and wisdom 9
[If the law teacher has in mind all the pertinent and most
valid premises to, be applied, he can reply immediately But the
best that most, of us can do, and we should be able to do this, is
to outline the network of interlocking premises, and to point out
that elimination of one as invalid may well entail the destruction
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of a link in the chain which causes the whole to fall. That is,
the teacher should be able to suggest pretty clearly to the
questioner just what he must consider and select from in the
background of premises, before the relatively soundest answer
can be given to the question. And the students should understand that evaluating a case in Law is the work of each individual in applying his own philosophy, i. e.-his own store of
irreducible and indispensable prennses. And if this is so,
probably no two persons among fifty would be in complete
agreement about the reply to be made.
In the most general sense, our premises rest upon our
experience. We may have experienced directly, or we may
have experienced indirectly through others, by their reporting
and interpreting what they have directly experienced. In this
empirical process, we find that we use certain primary premises
over and over again as a means of formulating a vast number
of secondary premises. Law, in its fact-finding function, relies
heavily upon these primary premises, and because the policymaking function of Law is largely dependent upon fact-finding,
Law in all its aspects is tied to these primary premises.
I have termed these primary premises the Credibility
Premises, because they relate to the means we employ to test
and to establish belief. They may fairly well be stated in a way
which almost all men will accept, and they may be given in three
propositions. (1) We do not accept as worthy of belief those
items in our experience which we "regard as not having been
accurately observed. (2) We do not accept as worthy of belief
those items in. our experience which we regard as not having
been accurately reproduced in the present from the past, whether
by memory, writing, instrument, or otherwise. (3)We do not
lend our credence to any proposition or conclusion whick we
do not believe to be the result of accurate interpretation of what
has been accurately observed and.accurately reproduced.
Credibility for each one of us hangs upon our satisfaction
that there have been accurate observation, accurate reproduction
of observed data, and accurate interpretation of what has
thus been observed and reproduced. The most materialistically
minded scientists and the most pious religious mystics -might

KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL

well agree upon these statements, their differences arising from
the application of the Credibility Premises, especially the interpretive proposition.
Our first hurdle in replying to our question, "Do you agree
with this case?", is a correct application of the Credibility
Premises to all involved as revelant facts, including as revelant
the broad facts as to human conduct and society in general, and
not just the narrow facts of the particular case. And right at
the start, the careful thinker must know how badly the cards
are stacked against him.
A corollary of the Credibility Premises is the premise
that credibility should not be extended to observation, reproduction, or interpretation which has been distorted and rendered
inaccurate by subjective elements such as bias and prejudice.
But how often do we find these subjective elements absent from
the processes2
The fallibility of human observation and memory is so
well known as to need little elaboration. People do not observe
accurately in the first place, the senses are unreliable, and human
beings are notoriously weak in the capacity for accurate memory
In the event that we use scientific instruments to observe and
record, we still must employ human senses to observe test tubes,
pointers or dials, and the like, as well as depend upon human
reasoning for making the interpretations. Thus when we
consider how open to error are the observations, reproductions,
and interpretations which determine our beliefs, we should feel
cautious and humble, because our assumptions rest upon such
frail supports. I make this statement as one having particular
force in its context here.
One cannot supply an easy and meritorious answer to our
question, because so much of the primary data and so many of
the controlling presumptions rest upon what at best can be but
a relatively accurate application of the Credibility Premises.
I concede that happily for the peace of mind of the majority of
us, we get along most of the time without undue worrying
about our application of these premises. We are willing to
accept the conclusions of those whom we trust as experts or
authorities, thus saving ourselves the trouble of establishing
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validity, or we frankly follow a course of going on our way
with a pseudo-sophisticated shrug of the shoulders, declaring,
"Oh well, you can't be sure about anything, and I'll believe
what most suits my temperament, and let the philosophers
waste their days arguing about the good, the true, and the
beautiful."
But in the context which concerns us we are
demanding exactness and reasons for our answers.
A study and evaluation of judicially decided cases almost
invariably leads us to a consideration of freedom and of limitations upon freedom. Liberty and limitations upon liberty are
the stuff of Law. While on the one hand Law may in a particular instance be preserving or enlarging the limited freedom
of one man, on the other hand and at the same time it is
artificially limiting the freedom of another man. The plaintiff,
when he prevails, secures his liberty against unjustified encroachments, while the defendant finds that the Law has imposed artificial limitations upon his power to do as he pleases
with the person or property of another, and so has restricted his
freedom.
Law imposes artificial limitations upon human liberty, but
in so doing it accepts a host of premises dealing with natural
limitations. When we try to evaluate a case, "agree" with it,
we must necessarily accept or reject a great many of these
premises of natural limitations. These premises include a great
many assumptions which common sense says are true, which are
practically axiomatic to many people, so that the fact that
philosophers, scientists, and theologians may question them
strikes these people as absurd. Among these quasi-axiomatic
premises, we find the premise that man is limited by nature in
his physical strength. Then there is the premise of the limitationsimposed by time, and there is the related prense pertaining to the limitations imposed by space. Man cannot do a great
many things at once or be in several places at the same time.
The passing of time brings decrepitude and decay, all limiting
man so that he cannot enjoy an optimum of liberty and life
forever.
These quasi-axiomatic premises of natural limitation also
embrace property There are assumptions that there is not
enough of the world's goods to go around and to satisfy the de-
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sires of all men, so that this assumption of natural limitations
upon the amount of goods available necessitatesa multitude of
artificial limitations upon man's freedom, imposed by Law m
its efforts to control the distribution and enjoyment of the
limited quantities of goods available. Law often stands in the
way of those who by preponderant physical power or by cunning would ride roughshod over their fellows m the struggle
for goods.
Then there are the premises pertaining to natural and
artificial limitations upon intangibles-limitations upon mental
ability and capacity, and as to how much freedom men are to
be permitted in the exercise of ideas. The proponents of
freedom of speech and of conscience base their arguments upon
the premises that the fewer restrictions there are placed upon
the mind and the transmission of ideas, the better off man will
be. There is the assumption that free exercise of mind and
conscience and ideas will bring betterment, betterment often
thought of in terms of happiness, of less pamn, of more pleasure.
Associated with this assumption is the prelmse that among the
attainable are happiness, less pain, more pleasure, truth, reality,
salvation. Why pursue intellectual liberty if you do not believe
it will gain you something which you believe -willbe an improvement? We believe, In this liberty, despite the fact that we cannot
absolutely prove the premise that freedom of the mind will
result pleasingly for us, and we do not carry too far the glib
saying that ignorance is bliss.
I have listed some of the more commonly followed premises,
but we must not forget how far they are from being satisfactorily proved, no matter how "obvious" and-.true they may
appear to us to be. One slightly familiar with. modern Science,
with Religion, and with Philosophy must realize how little is
finally and conclusively established as to the nature of reality,
the correctness of our assumptions as to time and as to space,
and as to the ultimate nature of the universe. How absolute
are our premises when a number of leading scientists of our day
tell us that it is a mental world, that space, time, energy, force,
and all of the old familiar aoncepts of physics are but "mental
constructs"g That they re creations of our own minds in the
attempt to understand reality, but that they are not necessarily
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reality2 When they say that the old controversy of matter
versus mmd is today the controversy of particles versus waves,
with the latter accorded preference, and the wave theory of
physics definitely more a mental concept than the particle
theory '2i
1
It is only fair to state that some modern scientists discredit
the religious and philosophical speculations which color the writings
of a number of our most popular and most outstanding scientists.
This dissent is based in part upon the view that laymen readers will
unjustifiably conclude that Science and Religion have merged,
whereas Science is really able to give no final explanations of any
sort as yet; offering, as it does, only reports of what it has observed
uniformly follows in a certain sequence when similar conditions are
present. Probably temperament has much to do with how far each
scientist will go when he speculates about reality Some scientists
suspect all religions, others have a perceptible religious bent.
Within the past months such works as HmvAN DESUnY, by Lecomte
du Nouy, and MAN DOEs NOT STAND ALONE, by A. Cressy Morrison,
have received popular acclaim, largely because of the religious and
moral flavor in the writings of these scientists.
For some rather typical words by the scientists who are not
averse to find religious and philosophical implications in Science,
the following quotations are submitted.
From Psiics AND PmiosoPHw (1943) by Sir James -Jeans, at
the pages indicated: "But the physical theory of relativity-has now
shown that electric and magnetic forces are not real at all;- they are.
mere mental constructs of our own, resulting from our rather misguided efforts to understand the motions of the particles. It is the
same with the Newtonian forces of gravity and with energy, momentum, and other concepts which were introduced to help,'us understand the activities of the world-all prove to be mere mental constructs and do not even pass the test of objectivity. If the materialists
are pressed to say how much of the world they now claim as material,
their only possible answer would be matter itself. Thus their whole
philosophy is reduced to a tautology for obviously matter must be
material. But the fact that so much of what used to be thought to
possess an objective physical existence now proves to consist only of
subjective mental constructs must surely be counted a pronounced
step in the direction of mentalism." (P.200.) "
,it has recently.
become clear that the ultimate processes of nature neither occur m,'
nor admit of representation in, space and time." (P.175.) "We know
matter only through the.energy or particles it emits but this provides no warrant for assuming that matter itself consists of atoms
either of substance or of energy." (P.179.) "When weview ourselves
in space and time, our consciousnesses are obviously the separate
individuals of a particle-picture, but when we .ipass beyond space
and time, they may perhaps form ingredients of mcsingle continuous
stream of. life. As it is with light and electricity, so.it may be with
life; -the phenomgna may be individuals ,carrying on separate existence in space and time, while in thedeeper reality beyond space
and time,. we may all be members of ond body." (P.204.) "But as we
pass from the phenomenal world of space and time to this substratum, we seem in sone way we do-not unders;nd to be -passing from
_.'erialism to mentalism, and so possibly qs1o from matter to mind.
lt'"may be then that the springs of events in this substratum incjude
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There is no necessity for us here to delve deeply into physics
and into metaphysics, however fundamental must be their use
in testing the validity of so many of the premises regarded as
obviously true. There is less justification for examining the
premise of free will and the prenuse of the existence of an
objective, external world, because whether or not we have free
our own mental activities, so that the future course of events may
depend in part on the mental activities." (P.215.)
From THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD (1927) by Arthur
S. Eddington, at the pages indicated, we find: "We all know that
there are regions of the human spirit untrammeled by the world of
physics." P.327.) "I repudiate the idea of proving the distinctive beliefs of religion either from the data of physical science or by the
methods of physical science." (P.333.) "The idea of a uiversal Mind
or Logos would be, I think, a fairly plausible inference from the
present state of scientific theory* at least it is in harmony with it."
(P.338.) "Science cannot tell whether the world-spirit is good or
evil." (P.338.) "Starting from ether, electrons and other physical
machinery we cannot reach conscious man and render count of
what is apprehended in his consciousness." (P.343.)
Nobel Prize Winner in Medicine, Sir Charles Sherrington, has
written in his book called MAN ON His NATURE (1941), as follows,
at the pages indicated: "If
you say that thoughts are an outcome
of the brain we as students using the eneirgy concept know nothing
of any relation between thoughts and the brain, except as a gross
correlation in time and space." (P.290.) "The mind which we experience, if we try to extend our experience into the process of its
making, seems to become almost at once unable to be experienced.
It eludes us by becoming subconscious. It is as though our mind
were a pool of which the movements on the surface only are what
we experience." (P.307.) "No attributes of energy seem findable in
the processes of mind
The two
remain refractorily apart.
They seem to be disparate; not mutually convertible; untranslatable
the one into the other. (P.312.) "
our world is in any case an act
of mind." (P.324.) "Science does not, I think, regard electrons, protons, neutrons, etc. otherwise than as mental figments, symbols. It
has not supposed them 'ultimate reality. " (P.344.) "Mind refuses
to be energy just as it has always refused to be matter." (P.348.)
"Mind, for anything perception can compass, goes therefore in our
spatial world more ghostly than a ghost. Invisible, intangible, it is a
thing not even of outline; it is not a 'thing. It remains without
sensual confirmation and remains without it forever. Stripped to
nakedness there remains to it but itself. What then does that amount
to? All that counts in life. Desire, zest, truth, love, knowledge,
'values, and seeking metaphor to eke out expression, hell's depth
and heaven's utmost height." (P.357.)
From HUa AN DESTINY (1947) by Lecomte du Nouy, at the pages
indicated: "It is clear, therefore, that expressions such as 'scientific
truth' should only be taken in a very limited sense, and not literally,
as the public so often does. There is no scientific truth in the absolute
sense." (P.15.) '"An explanation of the evolution of life by chance
alone is untenable today." (P.43.) "Once more we repeat-that there
is not a single fact or a single hypothesis, today, which gives an explanation of the birth of life or of natural evolution." (P.134.)
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will (we may function in a world of "unconscious determinism,"
as Jeans suggests), little difference is made in our Law. That is,
everything may exclusively be in my own mind, and the whole
panorama of events be as pre-determined and pre-arranged as the
running of a talking picture film, yet I could still believe that
I was exercising a free choice and that persons and things
outside of my own mind were affected by me, and could affect
me, in turn. There would still be prisoners, judges, jurors,
witnesses, attorneys, sheriffs, and Law in my experience, deceptively placed in an objective, external frame and seemingly
exercising free will.
The task of Law and of ourselves in attempting to evaluate
cases is to find acceptable premises which can guide us in determiinng when limitations of an artificial kind should be
placed upon human liberty and of what they should consist.
We -are in the position of asking what a man "ought" to be
required to do and what he "ought" to be prohibited from doing.
Should the judge have decided that the defendant "ought" to
have kept his oral promise? That he "ought not" to have
written as he did2 That he "ought not" to have hit another
man over the head with a baseball bat, and that he must now
pay damages, or, if it is a criminal case, pay a fine, or go to jail,
or both 9 Or that members of a religiously moved group " ought"
to obey this statute, although obedience to it clearly prevents
their carrying out a sincerely held tenet of their religin? Or
that Congress "ought not" to impose a certain control upon
prices, as it, has attempted to do9 Or that specified officers in
order to qualify for office "ought" to certify non-affiliation
with the Communist Party 9
Palpable conflicts occur when we seek the pertinent, premises
which bear upon the solution of our problem in any specific
case which concerns artificial limitations upon human liberty
Although many people may suppose that this is the age of
Science, and that the premises of Science should give us the
answers we seek with respect to the policies we should follow
we find that actually Science offers us little, if any, final help
here in our "ought" and "ought not" field of policy-making
Law, just as Science does not profess to lend us any final premises as to the nature of reality "Ought" and "ought not,"
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categorical imperative, doing unto others as you-would be done
by-all are derived from Religion, or from Philosophy, or.from
both, not from Science. Virtue and vice, good and evil, right and
wrong, as moral terms, are not from Science. Their use in
Sciencemust be only in the efficient sense of proper or improper,
efficient or inefficient means of attaining a desired end.
Science tells us nothing of whether in the first place we should
strive towards one end or another. Science consists of means,
not of ends.
Even the brasher sciences, Psychology and Sociology, reduce
basically to organized attempts to tell us from careful observations how it is believed men consistently act under specified
stimuli and conditions, not how they skould act. The ends we
seek are not found in test tubes or in psychological laboratories.
When a socioligist presumes to tell us how society should manage
or conduct itself and its members, 1. e.-what should be its
goals and ends and policies, the Sociologist surely is drawing not
from is science but from aesthetic prejudice, personal preference, Philosophy, or perhaps (to the scandal of many sociologists) from Religion itself.
Science assists time and time again by suggesting means
towards ends, and by giving us pretty fair predictions of what
reactions can be expected. Law finds Science indispensable in
this respect. But when we come to the ends, to policy making,
we find no direct premises of Science in point. Science is
amoral. To Science, killing of another human being in the
course of armed robbery is neither good nor bad, right nor
wrong, nor is the extermination of a whole race by concentration
camp methods, or by explosion of an atomic bomb. Science may
find these killings very interesting as phenomena and data, and
it may pass upon the efficiency of the methods used to bring
death, or even find interest in tracing the mental states of
perpetrators of such slaughter and of the victims. But it lies
beyond Science to tell us whether in the first place we "ought"
or "ought not" to adopt a policy of encouraging or of discouraging such killings. Test tubes and pointers on dials give us no
moral mandates.
Contracts might be supposed to rest pretty heavily upon
Economics, and the premises of the two be regarded as indepen-
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dent in large part of' the premises in other fields. But if you
ai making an exact and comprehensive attempt to state why
you agree or disagree with the decision of a case in Contracts,
you must follow through the whole chain of premises upon which
directly and ultimately your judgment depends. Thus we
accept repeatedly the prense that death is an enemy and that
sending one out of this life confers no benefit upon the one who
dies. A life in hand on this earth is considered as worth two
in the cosmic bush of tomorrow.
There are also involved necessarily the premises which treat
of the likelihood of and nature of an after-life. How completely
validated do many of us feel these premises to be 9 Yet what
a difference it might make if our assumption were that death
means a speedy translation into paradise, for in that case
whatever hastened one's translation into the ecstatic realm
would be approved, beneficial, and doubtlessly legal. The
atomic bomb, destroying the earth in one fell swoop, would be
a magnificent' savior. And; returning to Contracts and Economics, that which tended to further the making of a living
here on earth and to secure the necessaries of life, would be
open to objection that the effect would be to delay translation
into paradise and to cause men to linger longer here in an imperfect existence. Yet curiously the most religiously minded men,
the ones most militantly in accord with the old-fashioned Biblical concept of Heaven, do not encourage the coming of death as
a great desideratum.
Most of the decisive factors which deternnne whether you
agree with a case come not from Science, but from Religion and
from Philosophy because these last two make the ends of life
and of society their principal concern. Your Religion and
Philosophy in the last analysis govern your reply The premises
of Philosophy are most frequently founded upon rationalization
and intellectual juggling, whereas the premises of Religion are
less often the products of rationalization and are rather the
assumptions or doctrines adopted fully fledged and at times
dogmatically from those who have experienced What are termed
visions, revelations, theophanies, supernatural visitations, and
the like.
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The premises derived from Religion as to the ends to be
furthered in human conduct, many of which have been taken
over wholesale by our Law from the Christian Religion, generally
stress the concepts of virtue for virtue's own sake, of an inexorable duty, with a certain measure of final rewarding offered
as an inducement. The dogmatic rules which religious sects
propound frequently come from the pronouncements of a leader
or founder Who may rely more upon the validity of alleged
divine revelation than upon logic or philosophy for confirmation.
There are extant premises to the effect that card playing and
dancing are evils, to cite two of the commoner ones. And there
are special premises of different sects pertaining to tabus with
respect to certain kinds of food, clothing, words, and so on.
The acceptability of such premises, as usual, is dependent
upon how the Credibility Premises are employed. A man experiences mysterious voices or strange sights, telling him to do
or not to do certain things. He believes they have come from
God aiid accepts them unquestioningly He thiks that he has
accurately observed, accurately remembered, and accurately
interpreted them. But the unbeliever might say that the original
observation came from within the man and was the product
of hallucination or hypnosis and that therefore to interpret them
as of divine origin and persuasiveness is erroneous. But to the
devout believer, the wh6le process is credible, and he believes
that he experienced the word of God. Upon what do you rely
for your acceptance or rejection of the Biblical statement that
the Kingdom of Heaven is within us
The ends of Law-the policies which it pursues and which
appear in cases offered for our evaluation-invariably, then,
are judged by us in our religious and philosophical capacities
and not in our scientific natures, because Science tells us nothing
as to the final ends of human conduct which should be sought.
We need to see the whole problem, to grasp the vast anatomy
of Law with its connecting rib-like premises which invariably
take one back through the various fields of human experience
and thought. Many of the basic premises are used time and
time again for every case, and once sufficiently formulated
and validated need only appropriate mention. But our task is
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to formulate and validate the premises which we know, or
should know, are indispensable for our judgments.
I have not presented this outline with the serious notion
that what I have suggested could very practicably be followed
today We lack the time and the qualified teachers to carry
out such an approach to Law, but surely once or twice in the
course of a law student's training, he could be given a fair
realization of what should be done were a person to answer
adequately, honestly, and comprehensively that unassuming little
question, "Do you agree with this case 2 " And then he might
conceive in a humble spirit what really should and could be
the scope of a study of Law.
Meantime, for practical reasons, and because we stress what
the precedents and statutes "make" our laws to be, we shall
probably forego the premises approach to Law-the bridges
which connect its parts with the best interpretation of human
experience and thought. But for the student who is fascinated
by the policy-making function of Law and who is desirous of
learning about this, there is really no other procedure than the
diligent and persistent examination of prenses in broad and
open-minded criticism.
If you don't care why the Law is what it is but only what
its rules are, you are cold to the premises involved. If you are
interested in how Law got this way, or why it should be
changed, you will proBably be unable to avoid complying with
much that I have sketched in this outline relevant to procedure.
And it is the author's conviction that all law students, whatever
their future application of Law is to be, should have a definite
realization of what is required when we do our best to evaluate
and criticize the policies of the Law.
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